Excessive credit growth and countercyclical capital buffers in basel III: an empirical evidence from central and east european countries by Seidler, Jakub & Gersl, Adam
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Excessive credit growth and
countercyclical capital buffers in basel
III: an empirical evidence from central
and east european countries
Jakub Seidler and Adam Gersl
Czech National Bank, Charles University Prague
2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43689/
MPRA Paper No. 43689, posted 11. January 2013 14:44 UTC
ActA všfs, 2/2012, vol. 6 091
Excessive Credit Growth and Countercyclical 
Capital Buffers in Basel III: An Empirical 
Evidence from Central and East European 
Countries
Nadměrný růst úvěrů a proticyklický kapitálový 
polštář v Basel III: empirická evidence ze zemí 
střední a východní Evropy
ADAM GERŠL, JAKUB SEIDLER1
Abstract
Excessive credit growth is often considered to be an indicator of future problems in the finan-
cial sector. this paper examines the issue of how best to determine whether the observed 
level of private sector credit is excessive in the context of the “countercyclical capital buffer”, 
a macroprudential tool proposed in the new regulatory framework of Basel iii by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. an empirical analysis of selected Central and Eastern 
European countries, including the Czech republic, provides alternative estimates of excessive 
private credit and shows that the HP filter calculation proposed by the Basel Committee is not 
necessarily a suitable indicator of excessive credit growth for converging countries.
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Abstrakt
Nadměrný růst úvěrů je často považován za indikátor budoucích problémů ve finančním 
sektoru. tento článek se věnuje otázce, jak nejlépe určit, zda pozorované zadlužení privátního 
sektoru je již nadměrné v souvislosti s makroobezřetnostním nástrojem navrhovaným Basilej-
ským výborem pro bankovní dohled v novém regulačním rámci Basel iii, tzv. proticyklickým 
kapitálovým polštářem. Empirická analýza na vybraných zemích střední a východní Evropy 
včetně Čr ukazuje alternativní odhady indikátoru nadměrného zadlužení privátního sektoru 
a naznačuje, že výpočet pomocí HP filtru navrhovaný Basilejským výborem nemusí být pro 
konvergující země vhodným indikátorem nadměrného růstu úvěrů.
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1  The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and 
do not represent the views of the institution where the authors work.
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Introduction
the Basel iii reforms to the banking sector regulatory framework agreed in 2010 contain 
an important macroprudential element intended to dampen the potential procyclicality 
of the previous capital regulation. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 
2010a) has introduced a “countercyclical capital buffer” aimed at protecting the banking 
sector from periods of excessive credit growth, which have often been associated with 
growth in systemic risk. in good times, banks will – in accordance with set rules – create 
a capital reserve which can then be used to moderate contractions in the supply of credit 
by banks in times of recession.
one region that recorded a boom in lending to the private sector in the lead-up to the 
global financial crisis was the Central and East European (CEE) countries.2 the observed 
credit expansion was driven by many factors relating to both the demand and supply side 
of the credit market. although the credit growth in these transition economies started 
from very low levels, the rate of growth in many countries has raised concerns about how 
sustainable such growth is in the medium term and whether it poses significant risks to 
the stability of the financial sector.
this paper aims to draw on the historical experience of the CEE countries with credit ex-
pansion and, using the method proposed by the Basel Committee, to calculate and discuss 
what the countercyclical capital buffer level these countries might have had if the newly 
proposed regulation on the creation of capital buffers had existed before the crisis. the 
motivation for this analysis is to determine how suitable the Basel Committee’s proposed 
method for calculating excessive credit using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is for the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. in these countries, rapid credit expansion may 
simply mean convergence to values typical of the advanced nations, and not excessive 
borrowing. for this type of country, we propose to use a method involving estimation 
of the fundamental-based equilibrium private credit level. Given that different countries 
have different characteristics, the Basel Committee allows national regulators to exercise 
discretion and specify different methods for setting the countercyclical capital buffer.
the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the risks associated with excessive 
credit expansion, looks at the situation in selected Eu countries before the global finan-
cial crisis broke out, and briefly examines the logic of the countercyclical capital buffer as 
proposed by the Basel Committee. Section 3 takes a closer look at the disadvantages of 
applying the HP filter method and proposes an alternative technique for calculating exces-
sive credit – the out-of-sample method. Both these calculation methods are then used on 
data for ten CEE countries. Section 4 illustrates the different implications of the alterna-
tive indicators of excessive credit growth for the countercyclical capital buffer settings 
of the banking sectors of the countries analysed. the conclusion attempts to generalise 
the results of the analysis and formulate recommendations for the national authorities 
responsible for macroprudential policy. 
2  In this study, the group of CEE countries consists of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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1 Excessive Credit Growth
Credit growth in CEE countries has caught the attention of many studies over the past dec-
ade. these studies have tried to identify not only the determinants of credit growth, but 
also its equilibrium level (Enoch and Ötker-robe, 2007; égert et al., 2006). the credit boom 
in some transition economies was strong enough to raise concerns about whether this 
trend was simply a manifestation of convergence to the average credit levels in advanced 
nations, or whether it was a case of excessive growth posing a risk to macroeconomic 
and financial stability (Hilbers et al., 2005). the central banks and supervisory authorities 
of some countries even assessed the situation as critical and in 2004–2007 introduced 
a series of tools for limiting credit growth (dragulin, 2008; Herzberg, 2008). these tools 
ranged from “soft” measures, such as increased risk weights on selected loans and the 
introduction of guidelines and limits (e.g. Estonia), through to very “hard” administrative 
restrictions on credit portfolio growth (Bulgaria). the extent of the measures, as measured 
by the number of different tools used to limit credit growth, was correlated to a large 
degree with the credit growth rate (see figure 1). However, it is difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of the tools used, since most of them were applied just before the global 
financial crisis erupted. the decline in credit growth observed since then may thus have 
been due more to the sharp economic contraction and reduced demand for loans. the 
studies conducted up to now tend to conclude that the aforementioned tools are pretty 
ineffective and that credit booms can be limited in only a very limited way during good 
times (Kraft, 2005; Herzberg, 2008). 
Figure 1: Credit growth and number of tools applied to limit credit booms (number of 
measures on x-axis; average year-on-year real credit growth in 2005–2007 on y-axis)
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Figure 2: Private credit ratios in selected Eu countries (as % of GdP; 2007 Q4)
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despite the comparatively strong credit boom observed in 2003–2007, the stock of loans 
in many CEE countries in the pre-crisis year 2007 was still relatively low, especially in com-
parison with other Eu countries (see figure 2). Nevertheless, in terms of the private-credit-
to-GdP ratio, some countries of the region had reached levels typical of some euro area 
countries. the question therefore arises whether they were already showing excessive 
credit levels. one limitation of this comparison is that is based solely on data on domestic 
bank loans. this indicator understates total private credit, as it neglects loans provided by 
non-bank financial intermediaries and loans provided directly from abroad. 
Excessive credit growth can threaten macroeconomic stability in many ways. Given that 
lending supports consumption, growth in private sector loans can over-stimulate aggre-
gate demand beyond the framework of potential output and cause the economy to over-
heat, with knock-on effects on inflation, the current account deficit, interest rates and the 
real exchange rate.
at the same time, lending institutions can, in an economic growth phase, have over-op-
timistic expectations about borrowers’ future ability to repay their debts and therefore 
very often lend to high-risk borrowers. the upshot is that the bulk of “potentially” bad 
loans arise during upward phases of the credit cycle. in some CEE countries, private loans 
were provided in foreign currency because foreign interest rates were lower (see figure 
3). this further increases the risks for the banking sector, because if the domestic currency 
depreciates, the volume of credit expressed in the domestic currency rises, debt servicing 
costs go up, and foreign exchange risk turns into credit risk. in many cases, therefore, the 
aforementioned measures to contain credit growth were targeted primarily at reducing 
growth in foreign currency loans (Steiner, 2011). furthermore, if a domestic credit boom 
is financed from foreign sources, as was the case in several CEE countries (except for the 
Czech republic, Slovakia and Poland), the risk of the domestic banking sector having in-
sufficient balance-sheet liquidity (roll-over risk) increases. in economic bad times, domes-
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tic banks face a high risk of outflows of short-term foreign funds that cannot be financed 
by the sale of liquid assets (Hilbers et al., 2005).3 
Figure 3: Shares of foreign currency bank loans (as of end-2009; as % of total loans to 
given sector)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Czech Rep.
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Poland
Romania
Hungary
Lithuania
Estonia
Latvia
Non-financial corporations Households
Source: ECB 
Note: Slovak Republic and Slovenia were already members of the euro area in 2009, 
so their foreign currency loans comprise currencies other than EUR.
Figure 4: Countercyclical capital buffer (% of rwa as function of credit-to-GdP gap in 
p.p.)
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3  In this regard, the Czech Republic has a very favourable deposit-to-loan ratio. For a comparison with other 
EU countries, see CNB (2010, section 1.3.1).
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a bursting of the credit bubble and negative macroeconomic developments, leading to 
external financing constraints and growth in non-performing loans (NPl), can therefore 
cause the banking sector serious difficulties. imf (2004) estimates that more than 75% 
of credit booms were followed by banking or currency crises. this fear is consistent with 
existing studies in the field of early warning signals, according to which excessive credit 
growth can be considered one of the most reliable indicators of future problems in the 
banking sector (Borio and lowe, 2002; Borio and drehmann, 2009; Jimenez and Saurina, 
2006; Saurina et al., 2008).
as part of the preparation of the new Basel iii regulatory framework for banks, the Basel 
Committee (BCBS, 2010a, 2010b) has proposed several tools for reducing the procyclical 
behaviour of the banking sector.4 one of the key tools is a proposal for banks to create 
countercyclical capital buffers during credit booms.5 Such buffers, expressed as a percent-
age of risk-weighted assets (rwa) and covered by high quality capital (tier 1, or even core 
tier 1), would be set by the regulator within the range of 0% to 2.5%. as a guide for the 
setting of the buffer, the Basel Committee is proposing to use and regularly publish the 
difference between the current private credit ratio as a percentage of GdP and its trend 
value estimated using the HP filter (the “credit-to-GdP gap”). However, regulators may also 
use other methods to calculate the trend and other variables, such as the prices of various 
relevant assets and credit conditions. in bad times, this capital buffer would be “released” 
in order to slow any fall in the credit supply and thereby reduce the procyclicality of the 
financial system.
the Basel Committee document itself (BCBS, 2010b) proposes to use the aforementioned 
guide as follows. the capital buffer would start to be created when the credit-to-GdP gap 
exceeded two percentage points. if the gap reached 10 percentage points or more, the 
buffer would reach the aforementioned maximum of 2.5% of rwa. for gaps of between 2 
and 10 percentage points, the buffer would vary linearly between 0% and 2.5%. for exam-
ple, for a gap of six percentage points the buffer would be 1.25% of risk rwa (see figure 
4). for cross-border exposures, the buffer set by the regulator in the foreign jurisdiction 
would apply. for cross-border banking groups, the capital buffer would be applied on 
both a solo and a consolidated basis.
it became clear during the discussion phase within the Basel Committee that a simple 
filtering technique would in many cases not necessarily lead to reliable estimates of ex-
cessive credit, so the final version of Basel iii (BCBS, 2010b) gives regulators considerable 
discretion to set the buffer. the primary aim of the buffer, however, is not to restrict credit 
growth, but to create a capital reserve to give the banking sector greater protection from 
sudden changes in the credit cycle. at the same time, the Basel Committee documents 
emphasise the complementarity of this buffer with other macroprudential tools (BCBS, 
2010b, p. 5), such as various limits on key indicators of borrowers’ ability to repay loans 
(the loan-to-collateral and loan-to-income ratios).
4 The issue of procyclicality of the financial system and its sources and potential consequences was discussed 
in a thematic paper in Geršl and Jakubík (2012).
5 With regard to the objective of reducing the procyclicality of the financial system, the Basel Committee stated 
explicitly in its December 2009 consultative document (BCBS, 2009) that the aim of this buffer was to “achieve 
the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth”.
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2 Methods for Estimating the Equilibrium Credit Level
a major problem in constructing an excessive credit growth indicator is determining what 
level of credit is excessive and might pose a threat to the financial sector. one traditional 
method is to apply the statistical Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which obtains the trend 
from a time series. By comparing the actual credit-to-GdP ratio with its long-term trend 
obtained using the HP filter we can then estimate whether or not the credit level is exces-
sive. this method is used quite routinely in the literature (Borio and lowe, 2002; Borio and 
drehmann, 2009). Hilbers et al. (2005), for example, consider a credit-to-GdP gap of great-
er than five percentage points to be an indicator of excessive credit in the economy. 
although the HP filter method is used quite often to determine trends in macroeconomic 
variables, it does have its drawbacks. a time series trend is dependent to a significant 
extent on the length of the chosen time series and the calculation is very sensitive to the 
smoothing parameter (lambda). a big problem as regards practical application in macro-
prudential policy is “end-point bias”, which generates a highly unreliable estimate of the 
trend at the end of the data period.6 macroprudential policy, which, by contrast, requires 
assessment of the trend on the basis of current (i.e. end-of-period) data, would therefore 
be reliant on indicators subject to a high degree of uncertainty. in the case of some CEE 
countries with relatively short time series, credit growth is incorporated directly into the 
trend itself by the HP filter, i.e. credit growth excess is counted as a trend (Cottarelli et 
al., 2005). another relevant question is whether the credit ratio should take into account 
other denominators besides GdP, such as financial assets or total assets of the private 
sector. although GdP is correlated to a significant extent with private sector income and 
therefore serves as an indicator of the ability to repay a given amount of loans, holdings 
of financial assets (deposits and securities investments) and non-financial assets (e.g. real 
estate) are also relevant to the evaluation of excessive credit.
figure 5 presents credit gaps with alternative denominators (GdP and financial assets and 
total assets of the private sector) calculated using the HP filter on data for bank loans in 
the Czech republic with a high lambda parameter equal to 400,000. Such a high value 
of lambda was proposed in Basel iii with an argument that credit cycle is usually longer 
than the business cycle. the filter is applied to quarterly data for the period 1998–2010, 
which, however, is regarded as relatively short from the international perspective (Basel 
iii recommends at least a 20-year period). the estimates indicate that the current level of 
bank loans is above the long-term trend. However, the trend estimate is subject to a range 
of problems related to the short time series and above all to extraordinary factors linked 
with a fall in credit volume in 1998–2002 caused by a banking crisis in the 1990s and the 
clean-up of bank balance sheets ahead of the privatisation of large banks. 
as regards simulating possible macroprudential policy in the past, it makes more sense to 
apply the HP filter recursively, i.e. in each past period using only the data that were avail-
able in that period (at the end of 2005, for example, the trend value and therefore also the 
gap between the observed credit level and the trend is calculated on 1998–2005 data). 
6 One way of dealing with end-point bias is to extend the time series into the future by means of prediction. 
This, however, can introduce further uncertainty into the estimate linked with the quality of the prediction.
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this simulates the situation that the macroprudential policy-maker would hypothetically 
have found itself in had it been required to decide whether excessive credit growth was 
emerging. the calculated credit gaps expressed as a percentage of GdP indicate that the 
Czech republic would have found itself in a situation of excessive credit as early as 2004 
(see figure 5). However, the aforementioned drawbacks of the HP filter play an even great-
er role in the calculated gap, as the problem period of 1998–2002 influences the trend. 
Figure 5: Credit gaps in the Czech republic with alternative denominators (in p.p.)
Source: CNB, authors' calculations
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Figure 6: Credit-to-GdP ratios for a similar level of economic development (in %; GdP per 
capita in 2005 uSd = uSd 17,000 approx.)
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the main criticism of the HP filter technique, however, is that this method does not take 
into account economic fundamentals that affect the equilibrium stock of loans. an alterna-
tive method is to estimate the equilibrium private credit level in relation to key economic 
variables (such as the level of development of the economy measured in terms of real GdP 
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per capita). in nutshell, this method says that if GdP per capita – as a proxy for the stand-
ard of living of an economy – is the main and only economic fundamental, all countries 
with the same level of development should have a similar equilibrium credit level. Poorer 
countries should have a lower equilibrium credit level than wealthier countries. a com-
parison of bank loans as a percentage of GdP for the Czech republic in 2009 and selected 
euro area countries in years when they were at a similar level of economic development 
indicates, in contrast to the HP filter findings, that the credit ratio in the Czech republic is 
below the level consistent with its economic level (see figure 6).7
Given that the CEE countries started from very low private credit levels, however, the 
estimation of a suitable econometric model on data for these countries would capture 
the rapid growth caused by convergence towards the average level of the advanced na-
tions. as égert et al. (2006, p. 14) point out, such estimated elasticities of the relationships 
between fundamentals and credit would be overstated. at the same time, the estimates 
would reflect not the equilibrium level, but only the present relationship between eco-
nomic fundamentals and private credit. 
for this reason, the existing literature suggests using out-of-sample (ooS) panel estima-
tion, i.e. estimating the model on a different sample of countries (so called in-the-sample 
countries) and applying obtained elasticities to the data for the countries for which the 
equilibrium credit level is being estimated (so called out-of-sample countries). this ap-
proach assumes a priori that the stock of credit of “in-the-sample” countries, which serve 
for estimating elasticities, is at equilibrium on average, which is quite a significant as-
sumption. therefore, one needs to choose suitable group of “in-sample” countries that 
best meets the need to estimate the correct equilibrium relationships between economic 
fundamentals and private credit. the existing studies on this topic therefore normally 
use the developed countries of the Eu or oECd as appropriate countries for comparison 
(Kiss et al., 2006; égert et al., 2006). for this study, the advanced Eu countries were used 
as “in-sample” countries. owing to the current debate regarding the excessive debt of the 
PiiGS8 countries, these countries were omitted from the calculation of the equilibrium 
credit level.9
a variety of econometric methods can be used for ooS estimation. Given the proper-
ties of the variables used, however, traditional panel methods run into the problem of 
nonstationary time series, mutual regression of which can lead to spurious results. the 
traditional solution to the problem of nonstationarity of variables involves differentiat-
ing them. this step allows us to obtain the short-run relationship between the variables 
by regression, but the longer-run relationship is lost in the differentiation. the long-run 
relationship between nonstationary variables can be better estimated if the variables are 
7 This comparison of the level of economic development is based on average GDP per capita expressed in real 
USD and can be interpreted as the same volume of goods that could be bought in the USA with the average 
GDP of the given country in the given year.
8 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain.
9 However, nations that are structurally quite different from the CEE countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
remain in the sample of control countries. This may skew the results of the analysis towards higher equilib-
rium credit values for a given set of economic fundamentals.
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cointegrated. this fact is used by the ECm (error correction model) method, which esti-
mates not only the long-run relationship between the cointegrated variables, but also the 
potential deviation from this long-run relationship, which is gradually corrected through 
short-run adjustments.
we use the PmG (pooled mean group) estimation method, introduced for panel estimates 
by Pesaran et al. (1999). it, too, is based on this principle of short-run deviations from the 
long-run trend. this method can be used to estimate the long-run relationship between 
the credit-to-GdP ratio and other variables, which is identical for all countries, whereas 
the short-run adjustment towards this relationship can differ across countries. the PmG 
model therefore allows heterogeneity of the estimates for individual countries in the short 
run. However, the long-run relationship of the cointegrated variables is common to all the 
countries in the sample (more technical details regarding estimation method is available 
in the appendix).
the data used for the ooS method were obtained from the international monetary 
fund’s ifS (international financial Statistics) database, which provides the required mac-
roeconomic data with a sufficient history (which is vital for estimating long-run rela-
tionships). for this reason, we used data for a 30-year period (1980–2010). the available 
statistics on bank loans to the private sector were used as the credit indicator. these 
statistics slightly underestimate the total credit of the private sector, as they do not in-
clude non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g. leasing) and cross-border loans. data on 
aggregate household consumption, government debt, short-term interest rates, unem-
ployment, inflation measured by the GdP deflator, and GdP per capita in dollar terms 
were also used.
a long-run cointegration relationship between the credit-to-GdP ratio, the household 
consumption-to-GdP ratio and GdP per capita in uSd was identified for the set of in-
sample countries. the GdP per capita variable in the long-run relationship captures the 
different degree of wealth of the economy, which therefore also influences the equilib-
rium private credit level (terrones and mendoza, 2004).
the following equation gives estimates of the coefficients of the long-run relationship 
between the cointegrated variables and the values of the coefficients in the short run, 
which are given as the mean of all the estimates for the relevant countries.10
10 Based on the Hausman test, we can not reject null hypothesis of PMG being efficient estimator, thus PMG is 
preferred compared to the mean-group (MG) counterpart. MG estimator is a simple non-weighted mean of 
regression estimates for each individual country. Hausman statistic χ2(2) is equal to 0.9 (p-value = 0.637). 
Further, in the estimated equation only those variables were kept that were significant at least at a 10 % 
confidence level. Also, more empirical approach was used as in Sekine (2001), therefore in short-run part of 
the equation inflation is present, which is not in the long-run part.
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∆ (credit/gdp)t = −0.035(credit/gdpt-1 −(0.7cons/gdpt +0.013 gdp/popt )) + }long-run relationship
  (**) (***)  (***)
 + 0.87∆(cons/gdp)t −0.07inft + 0.014  }short-run adjustment
  (**) (*) (***)
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels 
respectively
Credit/gdp represents the ratio of private sector credit to GdP, cons/gdp denotes the ratio 
of household consumption to GdP, gdp/pop is GdP per capita in thousands of dollars 
and inf is the change in the price level, expressed as the year-on-year change in the GdP 
deflator.
Besides the aforementioned variables, other factors that might affect the explained credit/
gdp ratio were included in the model. for example, the government debt-to-GdP ratio 
might capture any crowding out of bank lending to the private sector.11 also, the real 
interest rate, or changes therein, should, as the cost of financing, be in a negative re-
lationship with the explained variable. However, as the final specification of the model 
indicates, these variables were not significant even at the 15% level.12 on the basis of the 
model, short-run adjustment dynamics towards the long-run trend is given as a function 
of the change in the consumption-to-GdP ratio and as a function of inflation. Based on 
the estimated coefficients, we can conclude that in the long-run relationship the credit-
to-GdP ratio increases with increasing wealth of the economy and with an increasing 
consumption-to-GdP ratio. this factor then positively affects the explained variable in 
the short-run relationship as well, while inflation acts in the opposite direction. these 
conclusions are in accordance with intuition as regards the effects of the variables used 
on the credit-to-GdP ratio.
the estimated parameters of the model were applied to data for the CEE countries to 
obtain values of the “equilibrium” credit ratio. the ooS calculations may in some cases 
imply significantly different conclusions regarding excessive credit compared to the cal-
culations using the HP filter (see figure 7). according to the HP filter, the credit-to-GdP 
gap indicates excessive credit in the recent period not only for the Czech republic, but 
also, for example, for Slovakia, lithuania, romania and Poland, whereas the economet-
ric estimate does not confirm this excessive credit level (values in the positive part of 
the chart indicates excessive private credit-to-GdP ratios). By contrast, Bulgaria, Esto-
nia, latvia and Slovenia now have excessive credit-to-GdP ratios according to the ooS 
method. it is clear, therefore, that the two calculation methods used give contradictory 
results in some cases.
11 For this reason, we would expect a negative relationship between the government debt ratio and loans to 
the private sector. The fact that a less indebted government sector would be able to provide more significant 
support if the banking sector ran into serious problems is relevant for assessing whether the current private 
sector credit level is excessive with regard to financial stability.
12  Detailed description of the available data is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 7: Comparison of credit-to-GdP ratios for various calculation methods (in p.p.)
Chart 7
Comparison of credit-to-GDP ratios for various calculation methods
(in p.p.)
Source: IMF IFS, WB WDI, authors' calculations
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.2
-.1
0
.1
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.2
0
.2
.4
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
-.4
-.2
0
.2
-.2
0
.2
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
Bulgaria Czech Republic Slovakia Estonia
Latvia Hungary Lithuania Slovenia
Poland Romania
HP-filter Credit/GDP gap
Out-of-sample Credit/GDP gap
Source: IMF IFS, authors’ calculations.
3 Simulation of the Size of the Capital Buffer 
one of the questions associated with the new Basel iii rules is whether the requirement to 
create a countercyclical capital buffer would contribute to the creation of capital reserves 
in those CEE countries which experienced significant problems in their banking sectors 
during the global financial crisis. in the following simulation, the size of the capital buffer 
is calculated for individual CEE countries using the two aforementioned methods, i.e. the 
HP filter method and the econometric ooS method. as the crisis did not manifest itself 
fully in the CEE countries until late 2008 and (in particular) 2009, i.e. after the collapse of 
lehman Brothers in September 2008, we set mid-2008 as the starting point for the buffer 
calculation. 
Table 1: Simulation of countercyclical buffer calculation (data as of 2008 Q2)
Credit-to-GdP gap (%)
Countercyclical capital buffer
(% of rwa)
HP filter out-of-sample HP filter out-of-sample
Bulgaria 11.4 10.8 2.5 2.5
Czech rep. 9.5 -15.0 2.4 0.0
Estonia 5.3 27.9 1.0 2.5
lithuania 6.9 -8.3 1.5 0.0
latvia 1.0 19.6 0.0 2.5
Hungary -1.4 -10.7 0.0 0.0
Poland 3.0 -23.3 0.3 0.0
romania 6.1 -27.3 1.3 0.0
Slovakia 6.1 -22.8 1.3 0.0
Slovenia 5.4 5.5 1.1 1.1
Source: authors' calculations
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the results of this simple simulation indicate that only four countries needed a counter-
cyclical capital buffer according to the ooS method (Bulgaria, Estonia and latvia needed 
the maximum possible 2.5% of rwa, while Slovenia needed 1.1% of rwa). 
Figure 8: Credit-to-GdP gap via out-of-sample and tier 1 ratio in 2008 (gap in p.p.; tier 1 
capital ratio in 2008)
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Figure 9: Credit-to-GdP gap via out-of-sample and change in roE (gap in p.p.; change in 
roE of banking sector in p.p.)
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Source: IMF, authors’ calculations
it is relevant to ask whether the banking sectors of these countries had a sufficient capital 
reserve already in 2008, building a “would-be” capital buffer in anticipation of possible 
problems in the banking sector due to the experienced credit boom. figure 8 indicates 
that with the exception of Bulgaria, which has set its minimum regulatory limit on capital 
adequacy higher than the traditional 8%, the countries identified by the ooS method as 
having excessive credit ratios (i.e. Estonia, latvia and Slovenia) had relatively low tier 1 
capital ratios.
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Several indicators can be used to compare the impacts of the crisis on the banking sec-
tors of individual countries. in this paper, we look at the change in banking sector profits 
between 2008 and 2009 (in p.p. of return on equity, roE), as profitability reflects both 
credit and market losses as well as impact on pre-provision income from possible higher 
funding costs. a simple graphical analysis reveals that the countries identified by the ooS 
method as having excessive credit ratios recorded large losses in their banking sectors in 
2009, causing the roE to decline dramatically (see figure 9) and even in some cases lead-
ing to negative roE in 2009 (latvia). two of the identified countries, namely latvia and 
Slovenia, have seen governments stepping in and providing public support in 2009. it is 
worth mentioning that the HP method would not have identified the problems building 
up in the latvian and Estonian economies, which were hit hard by the crisis and, especially 
in the case of latvia, suffered very high real costs.
Conclusions
this paper discusses methods for calculating excessive private sector credit in the Central 
and Eastern European region and their suitability as regards the creation of the counter-
cyclical capital buffer introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 
2010a). the BCBS has recommended the use of an excessive credit indicator based on the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter technique as a guide for setting this buffer.
the paper shows that the HP filter-based calculation of the excessive credit indicator is not 
necessarily appropriate in certain cases. for the CEE countries in particular, rapid credit ex-
pansion may simply mean convergence to values typical of the advanced nations, and not 
excessive borrowing. as an alternative, the paper suggests considering excessive credit 
calculation methods that better reflect the evolution of a country’s economic fundamen-
tals. one such method is an out-of-sample technique based on estimates for advanced 
Eu countries which are subsequently used to calculate the equilibrium credit levels of the 
CEE countries.
although statistical filtering techniques such as the HP filter do have a role to play in the 
analysis as a first step in the interpretation of the available data, a broader set of indicators 
and methods should be employed to determine a country’s position in the credit cycle. 
our chosen method, based on economic fundamentals, would have better identified the 
problem of excessive credit in those CE countries whose banking sectors recorded seri-
ous problems during the crisis. although this calculation technique has its limitations, it 
can be considered as a complementary indicator of excessive credit, especially for small 
converging economies.
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Appendix
A) Detailed description of the data time series used:
imf ifS: af.zf... National Currency per uS dollar average period
imf ifS: 22d..z ClaimS oN PriVatE SECtor
imf ifS: 32d..zf... ClaimS oN PriVatE SECtor
imf ifS: 32aN.zw... ClaimS oN GENEral GoVt. (NEt)
imf ifS: 222a..zf... ClaimS oN GENEral GoVErNmENt
imf ifS: 60P..zf... interest rate
imf ifS: 64...zf... index CPi
imf ifS: 67r..zf... unemployment rate
imf ifS: 99z..zf... Population
imf ifS: 96f..zw... HouSEH.CoNS.EXPNd.,iNCl.NPiSHS EuroS
imf ifS: 99BiPzf... deflator HdP (base year = 2005)
imf ifS: 99B..zf... Gross domestic Product in the National Currency
time series of interest rates for some countries were completed using the ECB and Euro-
stat databases and data provided by national central banks.
B) Technical details regarding used PMG and MG estimates
the pool mean group (PmG) and the mean group (mG) estimators are error correction 
forms of the autoregressive distributive lag (ardl) model, where the dependent variable 
in its first differences is explained by the lagged independent and dependent variables in 
both levels and first differences. the equation is expressed as follows:
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where y is dependent variable, x represents set of v independent variables, p and q represent 
maximum lags used, and α, β, c, and γ are estimated coefficients. Coefficient α represents the 
long-term relationship, which is specific for each cross-section in the MG estimator or the 
same for every country in the case of PMG estimator.  Parameter ρ is the country specific 
error correction term, i.e. the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium. 
For more details see Pesaran et al. (1999). 
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where y is dependent variable, x represents set of v independent variables, p and q repre-
sent maximum lags used, and α, β, c, and γ are estimated coefficients. Coefficient α repre-
sents the long-term relationship, which is specific for each cross-section in the mG estima-
tor or the same for every country in the case of PmG estimator. Parameter ρ is the country 
specific error correction term, i.e. the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium.
for more details see Pesaran et al. (1999).
